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ABSTRACT
Home-based Internet of Things (IoT) devices have gained
in popularity and many households became “smart” by us-
ing devices such as smart sensors, locks, and voice-based
assistants. Given the limitations of existing authentication
techniques, we explore new opportunities for user authenti-
cation in smart home environments. Specifically, we design a
novel authenticationmethod based on behavioral features ex-
tracted from user interactions with IoT devices. We perform
an IRB-approved user study in the IoT lab at our university
over a period of three weeks. We collect network traffic from
multiple users interacting with 15 IoT devices in our lab and
extract a large number of features to capture user activity.
We experiment with multiple classification algorithms and
also design an ensemble classifier with two models using
disjoint set of features. We demonstrate that our ensemble
model can classify six users with 86% accuracy, and five users
with 97% accuracy.
1 INTRODUCTION
User authentication is one of the major challenges in se-
curity, and while a diverse set of solutions have been pro-
posed, the quest for the perfect solution continues. Tradi-
tional user authentication methods include passwords, hard-
ware tokens, and biometrics. Given the limitations of pass-
words [13, 19, 29] several well-known techniques are used in
practice to augment them such as multi-factor authentication
based on either a hardware token or a different channel (e.g.
email, SMS). These methods impede the usability of authenti-
cation, and introduce additional latency [10, 26]. Biometrics-
based authentication has been extensively used in various
forms (facial recognition, fingerprints, or retina scans), but
revocation and user impersonations are well-recognized lim-
itations of these methods.
The omnipresence of IoT devices such as sensors, locks,
entertainment devices, and voice-based personal assistants,
has made authentication in smart households more complex,
bringing new challenges. IoT devices are fundamentally dif-
ferent from personal devices and traditional authentication
methods are either not applicable or break the natural flow
of interaction with these devices. Deploying a screen or in-
put pad for each of these devices is either not practical or
costly. Some devices such as Amazon Echo Dot can perform
voice-based biometric authentication as an optional feature.
However, this feature can be circumvented as voice can be
spoofed and users might not be comfortable with their voices
being recognized due to privacy concerns [21]. Therefore,
better authentication methods are needed in the context of
smart homes.
One of the opportunities in solving this problem in smart
home environments is the relatively small number of users
for which authentication must be provided. Most American
households range in size from two to six members. Multi-
class classification algorithms can be trained for such small
sets and with minimal effort it can be ensured that adver-
saries do not interfere at training time. However, there are
several challenges in designing user authentication methods
for household IoT devices including: supporting a diverse set
of devices with minimal changes in their operation, main-
taining user privacy, and supporting a diverse set of policies.
Data that captures detailed user behavior (such as device
logs) tend to be device-specific and more invasive in terms
of privacy.
Our approach addresses these challenges by using the
IoT devices’ network traffic from the home router as data
source. In order to preserve user privacy we collect and
leverage the information in the headers of HTTPS packets
for our authentication system. This data includes minimal
information (timing, ports, bytes sent and received) with low
risk on user privacy. Additionally, to protect user privacy we
make the design choice of performing the model training
and testing locally in the user’s home, rather than remotely,
in the cloud. This implies that the authentication module
needs to reside in the smart home. To address the mis-match
between user-level semantics and network-level semantics
we observe the network traffic for a continuous time window
and design a machine learning (ML) model that uses features
aggregated over a recent time window to predict the user in
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the room. Finally, we train a multi-class classifier to predict
the likelihood that a certain user is in the room. The model
is trained based on historical data obtained in controlled
settings (knowing which user is in the room) and then used
at testing time to classify users by generating in real time
an authentication score based on the most recent observed
activity.
We leverage the IoT lab at our institution set up as a stu-
dio apartment and purchase a set of 15 IoT devices from
different categories, including voice assistants, smart kitchen
appliances, and entertainment devices. We make use of the
existing monitoring infrastructure in the lab to collect net-
work packets (pcap files) from all these devices. We design
an IRB-approved user study with multiple users participat-
ing in data collection over a period of three weeks. During
the training period, we use labeled data of user sessions and
extract features from HTTPS headers that capture user inter-
action with the IoT devices over a continuous time window.
We design and test several ML classification algorithms for
predicting the likelihood that a certain user is in the room.
During the regular user interaction with the IoT devices, the
authentication module continuously receives data extracted
from the most recent observation window and computes an
authentication score for each user. The score is made avail-
able to upper-level authorization systems that can implement
flexible policies according to the level of risk tolerated. For
example, these policies can be used for local services such
as log in to a laptop, to perform operations on IoT devices,
or to access cloud services, such as performing financial
transactions.
Our experimental evaluation shows that a Gradient Boost-
ing classifier achieves 81% precision and 80% recall at classi-
fying six users, based on IoT device features. For five users
the precision and recall are both 92%, for a 25-minute obser-
vation window. We also design a high-confidence ensemble
classifier with two models trained on disjoint set of features
(one on 420 device features and the second on 2910 domain
features). The ensemble generates an authentication score
only when the two models agree on the prediction. An en-
semble of two Gradient Boosting models achieves an F1 score
of 0.86 for six users and 0.97 for five users (at the cost of not
generating scores in 16 out of 91 sessions).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.We define our
problem and adversarial model in Section 2. We describe our
system design in Section 3 and our user study and data collec-
tion in Section 4. We present the evaluation in Section 5 and
related work in Section 6. We conclude the paper in Section
7 and include some additional results in the Appendix.
2 PRELIMINARIES AND BACKGROUND
In this section we provide an overview of methods for user
authentication, we define the problem we are solving, and
describe the adversarial model we consider in this work.
2.1 User Authentication
User authentication is a fundamental security process that
has been studied extensively throughout the years. Tradi-
tional user authentication methods are based on what users
know (e.g. passwords), what they have (e.g. hardware token),
or what they are (e.g. biometrics). Even though extensive
research shows password limitations [13, 19, 29], passwords
are still the de-facto standard for authentication in corporate
and home environments. Users are shown to pick weak pass-
words and they tend to reuse them across different services
[3]. Critical services do not always deploy proper password
data protection techniques, resulting in increased risk for
users in face of data breaches [1]. Several well-known tech-
niques are used in practice to augment passwords. Multi-
factor authentication methods use either a hardware token
or a different channel (e.g. email, SMS) for increasing the
confidence of authenticating users. These methods impede
the usability of authentication, and introduce additional la-
tency [10, 26]. Biometrics-based authentication such as key-
stroke dynamics, fingerprints, facial recognition, and voice
recognition, provide a convenient and reliable way to iden-
tify users [7, 20, 30]. However, revocation and user imper-
sonation are well-known challenge for these methods, in
addition to privacy implications on users [31].
Behavior-based authentication provides a safer and more
convenient way to identify users, based on their behavior,
how they behave. Such methods build behavioral models
based on the unique way the users interact with devices like
smartphones, tablets or touch screens. In the context of mo-
bile devices, several systems for continuous authentication
have been designed, for instance [23, 25]. They leverage a
number of behavior features extracted from user interaction
with their mobile devices, such as call logs, browser history,
application usage, and location. User authentication based
on WiFi signal of IoT devices has been also investigated
recently [24]. These systems can be used in a multi-factor
authentication system to additionally increase confidence of
user authentication.
2.2 Problem Definition
With the widespread usage of IoT devices in many house-
holds, new challenges and opportunities emerge. We pose for
the first time the problem of designing usable, behavioral-based
authentication models based on users naturally interacting
with IoT devices in their homes or familiar environments. We
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are interested in designing a lightweight authentication mod-
ule for smart homes that uses information extracted from
monitoring the user interaction with IoT devices. The system
should be able to identify with high accuracy each user from
a fixed set of known users based on their behavioral char-
acteristics. With user privacy as the premiere consideration
in our design, we intend to leverage a minimum number of
attributes that are universally applicable to a range of IoT de-
vices from different manufacturers. We consider here mainly
authentication based on behavioral features extracted from
network traffic generated by IoT devices in a smart home.
We envision such a system would learn from historical ob-
servations and create user profiles during a training phase.
At testing time, the authentication module generates an au-
thentication score mapped to the likelihood that a certain
user is in the room based on the most recent observation
of IoT device activity. The authentication module needs to
observe users during a contiguous observation window to
capture a sequence of user actions. The authentication scores
can be used by higher-level applications to create flexible
authorization policies that support various levels of risk.
2.3 Adversarial Model
We consider two main classes of adversaries:
Local adversaries. This adversary might be in close proxim-
ity or even inside the home environment, and interact with
some of the IoT devices in the home. This model captures
visitors, neighbors, kids, or roommates sharing the home.We
would like to prevent such an adversary to perform actions
like changing smart lock settings or making purchases on
Alexa on behalf of real users.
Remote adversaries.Remote adversariesmight not directly
have access to IoT devices, but they could compromise user
machines and accounts leveraging potential vulnerabilities
in the user devices. This adversary is motivated to imper-
sonate the real user to gain access to sensitive devices in
the home or perform more harmful actions. Remote attack-
ers can also inject network traffic in the smart home. This
is possible by a malicious app installed on a user’s smart
phone, or an adversary sending traffic to the home router.
The adversary is aware of standard network protocols and
applications, but he does not have full knowledge on the
exact user behavior.
We assume that adversaries are not in the system when
ML training is performed. A training-time attack against ML
models is called a poisoning attack (e.g., [6, 27, 32]) and pro-
tecting against it is orthogonal to our work. This guarantees
that the trained ML models for user authentication are trust-
worthy. Both types of adversaries might act at testing time
with the goal of influencing the decision of theMLmodel. We
assume that adversaries have relatively limited interaction
with the IoT home devices and they cannot perfectly imitate
users in their behavior.
We envision that data collection and the authentication
module reside in a trusted device, like the home router or a
server. Compromising the authentication system by physi-
cally accessing it or by intercepting the communications is
not within our scope.
3 SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section we describe the goals motivating the design
of our system and then give an overview of our approach.
3.1 Design Goals
In designing our system for user authentication in smart
homes, we set forward the following design goals:
Operate in a smart home environment with multiple
users. We intend our system to be used in a smart home
environment with several users actively interacting with
diverse IoT devices. The average American household size in
2018 was 2.53, with most households (98.66%) having size at
most 6. Our system should provide good accuracy at the task
of classifying users from a small set of previously seen users.
Multi-class classifiers can be trained to predict the likelihood
that a certain user is in the room.
Support multiple heterogenous IoT devices. Compared
to traditional computing platforms, IoT devices are extremely
heterogeneous and diverse. This raises the challenge of de-
signing a flexible, general monitoring platform that can sup-
port devices from different manufacturers and can be easily
extended as new devices become available. Data available
usually consists of event logs and network traffic. We ob-
serve that network traffic is much more general and more
likely to support the diversity of IoT devices.
Maintain user privacy.User privacy is an important design
consideration, given the nature of the applications and the
environment where users perform their actions. We intend
our system to work without access to user personal identifi-
able information (PII). Most network traffic of IoT devices
is over HTTPS, with encrypted payloads in the transmitted
packets.
Capture user actions for behavioral modeling. User be-
havior is defined by their interaction with the devices and
the applications. User (and application) behavior results in
several packets disseminated over the network. An approach
based on more general information, like network traffic,
needs to map low-level information from network pack-
ets to higher-level user actions (for instance, brew a coffee
or change the smart lock settings) in order to capture user
behavior. This creates a challenge as a single action could
generate many packets addressed to different external desti-
nations.
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Measure authentication confidence.Most systems for ac-
cess control and authorization need to make an ultimate
decision whether a user is allowed to access a critical re-
source or not. Our goal is to create an authentication service
that generates authentication scores on a continuous basis.
These scores should provide a measure of authentication
confidence, which is leveraged by higher-level authorization
systems. For instance, to perform a high-value financial trans-
action, the authorization system could set the authentication
score threshold at 0.95 and require another authentication
factor (such as SMS). We believe that reliable authentica-
tion measures as we aim to design can greatly augment the
flexibility of current authorization systems.
3.2 System Overview
Our Approach. We address the challenges raised by our
design goals by using the IoT devices’ network traffic from
the home router. In order to preserve user privacy we collect
the headers of the HTTPS packets that include minimal in-
formation such as timing, ports, destination address, bytes
sent and received, posing low risk on user privacy. Addi-
tionally, to protect user privacy we make the design choice
of performing the model training and testing locally in the
user’s home, rather than remotely, in the cloud. This implies
that the authentication module needs to reside in the smart
home. To address the mis-match between user-level seman-
tics and network-level data we observe the network traffic for
a continuous time window and design an ML model that uses
features aggregated over a recent time window to predict
the user in the room. Finally, we train a multi-class classifier
to predict the likelihood that a certain user is in the room
based on the most recent activities.
Figure 1 gives an overview of our system architecture. We
installed 15 IoT devices in the IoT lab at our institution. We
make use of the existing monitoring infrastructure in the
lab to collect pcap files from all these devices. We design an
IRB-approved user study with multiple users participating
in data collection over a period of three weeks. During the
training period, we use labeled data of user sessions and
extract features from HTTP headers over a continuous time
window (with varying length). We design and test multiple
ML classification algorithms with the aim of obtaining good
accuracy at identifying users. During the regular user in-
teraction with the IoT devices, the authentication module
continuously receives data extracted from the most recent
observation window and computes an authentication score
for each user. The authentication score can be used by upper-
level authorization systems for flexible policies according
to various levels of risk. For example, log in to a local de-
vice might require a lower score than performing a financial
transaction in the cloud.
Belowwe provide more details about the machine learning
models we used and the features we selected for our multi-
class classifier.
3.3 Machine Learning Design for User
Classification
We design a machine learning (ML) system that: (1) learns
user profiles over time, using data extracted from network
traffic generated by IoT devices; and (2) computes an au-
thentication score in real time based on the most recent
observation interval. The authentication score estimates the
confidence or probability of the actual user being in the room.
In more details, the ML system is trying to learn profiles
for a set of users U = {U1, . . . ,Um}. In our specific appli-
cation, user observation is performed over time, and thus
the features or user attributes need to be defined over an
observation window. We design the system to predict at time
t the probability that a certain user is in the room, i.e.,:
Ati = Pr [U ti |F (t ,∆)],∀i ∈ [1,m]
Given an observation or feature set F (t ,∆) computed over
the time window [t − ∆, t] of size ∆ (most recent history of
length ∆), the system aims to predict an authentication score
Ati at time t for each userUi . This can be achieved by training
a multi-class classifier f ∈ H , where H is the hypothesis
space. TheML algorithm is given historical training data of la-
beled user activities:Dtr = {(F1(t1,∆),L1), . . . , (Fn(tn ,∆),Ln)},
with labels Li ∈ U and Fi (ti ,∆) the set of features computed
over observation intervals [ti , ti − ∆] of length ∆. At the end
of training, a model f is selected to minimize a certain loss
function on the training set.
A probabilistic model in fact estimates the probability that
a user generates the observed features in themost recent time
window of length ∆. The sum of the predicted probabilities
is always 1:
m∑
i=1
Ati =
m∑
i=1
Pr [U ti |F (t ,∆)] = 1,∀t
At testing time, the model is applied at time t to the most
recent observation window (i.e., features F (t ,∆) extracted
during time interval [t − ∆, t]) and generates an authentica-
tion score Ati for each userUi ∈ U.
We experiment with multiple ML classification algorithms,
including Logistic Regression, Random Forest, and Gradient
Boosting that fit our framework very well. The most chal-
lenging issue in our design is to create appropriate feature
representations that capture user behavior over the recent
time window and can be used to effectively differentiate mul-
tiple users with high confidence. We discuss multiple feature
representations next.
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Figure 1: Architecture diagram of the data-flow and proposed authentication process
Attribute Type Description
Device Name Categorical Name of the smart device (extracted from the MAC address)
Time Integer The timestamp of the packet
Packet length Integer Size of the packet in bytes
Domain Categorical Domain name of the destination, if available
Direction Categorical Direction of the packet (outgoing/incoming)
Protocol Categorical Transport protocol of the packet (TCP/UDP/ICMP)
Destination Port Categorical Port number of the destination address
Source Port Categorical Port number of the source address
Table 1: Packet-level attributes: These fields are available for each HTTPS packet from its header.
Type Feature Category Operations Description
Device/Domain Incoming packet size count, sum, min, max, std. dev., mean, median Statistics on incoming packets
Device/Domain Outgoing packet size count, sum, min, max, std. dev., mean, median Statistics on outgoing packets
Device/Domain Protocols count Packet counts per protocol (TCP, UDP, ICMP)
Device/Domain Inter-event times count, sum, min, max, std. dev., mean, median Statistics on inter-packet timing
Device Domains distinct Distinct domain count
Table 2: Features aggregated by time window.
3.4 Feature Representation
Packet-level attributes. Our system design is based on fea-
tures extracted from HTTPS traffic captured at the router in
the smart home. To protect user privacy, one of our design
consideration is to inspect only headers of the HTTPS pack-
ets. The fields that we leverage in our design are shown in
Table 1. They include the device identifier (extracted from
the MAC address in each packet), timing, the packet length,
the direction (outgoing or incoming), transport-level proto-
col (TCP, UDP, or ICMP), destination port, source port, and
destination domain. We analyze the DNS queries from the
network traffic and extract mapping of external IP addresses
to domain names (FQDN).
Feature definition. Using packet-level attributes directly
as features in an ML model is not feasible due to the large
number of packets that are usually generated in a network.
Moreover, for our task for user authentication we need ag-
gregated behavioral indicators, beyond the scope of a single
network packet. Therefore, we need to experiment with mul-
tiple feature representations that capture the user behavior
over a time interval of length ∆. For our approach, we use a
sliding-window method to advance the time t at which we
compute authentication scores by one minute. We experi-
ment with multiple values for the window length (from 5
to 30 minutes). For instance, if a user is in the room for an
interval of 30 minutes during training and ∆ = 5 minutes,
we generate 26 sliding windows of size 5 minutes. Features
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are generated for each sliding window and labeled with the
identity of the user. At testing time, we compute an authen-
tication score at each time t based on the most recent sliding
window of size ∆, i.e., the interval [t − ∆, t]. That means,
implicitly, that we need to observe the user for of period at
least ∆ before computing an authentication score.
The first source of data for feature extraction is user in-
teractions with different IoT devices. It is well known that
people have different interests and users prefer to interact
with certain type of devices. Moreover, the same user tends
to use the same set of IoT devices they are most familiar with
over time. We believe that device usage is a strong behavioral
indicator, as also confirmed in our evaluation.
Therefore, we define the first set of device-level features
extracted from packet attributes aggregated per device. In
particular, we would like to capture information about user
interaction with each IoT device during the time window
∆, such as: (1) various statistics on incoming and outgoing
packet lengths; (2) packet counts for transport-level proto-
cols; (3) number of distinct domains contacted by each device;
(4) statistics on inter-arrival timing of packets. The list of
aggregated features is given in Table 2, and all the features
are aggregated over the packets sent and received by each
device in each time window of size ∆. An important design
decision is to separate incoming and outgoing traffic, as they
might have different distributions. In particular, user inter-
action with voice assistants could result in large volumes
of incoming traffic (for instance, if a user listens to music),
while device communication with the cloud induces regu-
lar outgoing communication. We denote this set of device
features in time window [t − ∆, t] as: F (t ,∆)dev.
The second source of data useful for feature generation
is user communication with external destinations (domain
names). This is motivated by our observation that differ-
ent Alexa skills connect to different external domains. For
instance, listening to music may stream data from the spo-
tify.com domain, whereas playing fireplace sounds uses kwimer.com.
As the set of external domain names is very large and cloud
services use many sub-domains for load balancing, we trans-
form our domain names to second-level domains and com-
pute features per second-level domain. For each second-level
domain, we use aggregated features including statistics on
incoming and outgoing packet lengths, inter-event times and
packet counts for transport protocols, computed over all the
packets exchanged with that external domains in the time
window of size ∆. We denote this set of domain features in
time window [t − ∆, t] as: F (t ,∆)dom.
For our task of user authentication, we will consider sev-
eral feature representations:
(1) Device-only: Estimate and predict P[Ui |F (t ,∆)dev];
(2) Domain-only: Estimate and predict P[Ui |F (t ,∆)dom];
(3) Both device and domain: Estimate and predict
P[Ui |F (t ,∆)dev; F (t ,∆)dom].
4 SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
4.1 User study
We performed a user study with multiple users over three
weeks to generate the dataset used to train and test our au-
thentication models. We utilize the IoT lab at our institution
to conduct our user study and monitor users while they in-
teract with a smart-home like environment. The lab is an
enclosed studio with a kitchen and living area, equipped
with a range of Internet-connected devices and appliances
to simulate a smart household. The lab is available for use
by researchers at our institution. We collected data from 15
IoT devices installed in our IoT lab, as described in Table 3.
We asked users to use the room for multiple sessions, each
of them lasting at least 15 minutes. One of our requirements
was that users are alone in the room while we perform the
user study. The reason is to facilitate data labelling and to
ensure that we do not monitor data generated by other lab
users. Users logged their start and end times using their
mobile phones in order to label the data for each session.
We held several orientation sessions before the actual data
collection, to help users become familiar with the devices.We
did not provide any scripts and users were asked to interact
with the devices in a natural manner.
In total, we recruited 10 users, who participated in the
study and generated 74 sessions with a duration of 1660
minutes. The usage statistics per user are in Table 4. We
collected 4,082,975 packets, including connections to 316
external destinations and 97 second-level domains. In the
rest of the paper, we focus on six users: 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 10
who generated more than 6 sessions.
IRB approval. Our study was approved by the IRB at our
institution. All researchers with access to the collected data
performed the IRB training and users were required to con-
sent to the data being collected while they use the room.
Users were informed of the project goal before participating
in the study. As we only extracted fields from packet headers
of HTTPS traffic, we did not have access to any user per-
sonal information. To further protect the privacy of users, we
anonymize the collected data by creating a unique user ID
for each study participant. Our data is stored in anonymized
format on our servers, not directly identifying the partici-
pants.
Implementation. The lab network is monitored at all times
and the network traffic (pcap files) of all the IoT devices is
collected in a server located in the room. We did not collect
data from users’ personal devices such as laptops and phones,
as we used a MAC address filter to collect only IoT device
6
Device User Activities
Echo Dot - Echo Spot - Echo Plus Alexa voice assistants to support voice commands and control other smart devices
Google Home Mini Google voice assistant to support voice commands and control other smart devices
Harman Kardon Invoke Cortana voice assistant to support voice commands and control other smart devices
LG Smart TV Watch TV or stream content through third party applications
Roku TV Stream content through third party applications
Amazon Fire TV Stream content through third party applications
Philips Hue Bridge Set the color and brightness of the bulbs
Samsung Smart Fridge Use fridge, interact with the LCD Display
Smart Microwave Open, Heat up food, Close
iKettle Smart Kettle Boil water
Behmor Smart Brewer Brew coffee
SmartThings Hub Trigger motion and contact sensors
Table 3: IoT Devices in the IoT lab.
User Sessions Total Time Avg. Duration
1 9 184 20
2 5 181 36
3 11 330 30
4 8 206 25
5 2 38 19
6 12 263 21
7 4 71 17
8 9 154 17
9 6 112 18
10 8 121 15
Table 4: The number of sessions, total time, and aver-
age session duration per user, all in minutes.
traffic. We created software that parses the HTTPS packet
headers and stores the fields from Table 1 in a Postgres data-
base. We extracted the device and domain features and stored
them in a different table in our database. For training our
models, we use the ML implementation from the Python
scikit-learn package. We performed cross-validation for all
our experiments and varied the ML hyper-parameters.
4.2 Data exploration.
We analyzed the collected data to compare different users
in terms of device and domain usage. In Figure 2, we show
the total data exchanged by device and user, the number of
packets, as well as the average length of packets. For some
devices such as Amazon Echospot and Google Home, the
amount of data transferred varies significantly by user. On
the other hand, some smart devices (such as the microwave
and smart kettle) are either not utilized by users, or they
do not generate a lot of network activity. Statistical features
such as average packet length provide more distinguishing
patterns across users than total number of packets or total
data transferred.
In Figure 3 we display the amount of data transferred, the
total number of packets, and the average packet length by
user and second level domains. We only included domains
with more than 10,000 packets for at least a user. While all
devices communicates with the cloud and CDN domains (e.g.,
cloudfront.com), some domains (such as iheart.com) exhibit
different patterns across users.
Next, we are interested in validating the hypotheses that
users have consistent behavior in multiple sessions and users
have differentiating behavior from other users. For this, we
plot the amount of data transmitted by different devices
over time for User 6 (in Figure 4) and User 10 (in Figure 5)
in three distinct sessions. Interestingly, some sessions of
the same user are similar (for instance, the first and third
session of User 6). However, users sometimes deviate in their
behavior across different sessions, as demonstrated by the
third session of User 10 (in which interaction with Echo Dot
is lower). Overall, Users 6 and 10 have different behavior in
their interactions with smart devices. However, while there
is some similarity across the same user’s sessions, these plots
also show that user behavior varies across sessions, making
behavioral authentication in this context challenging.
5 EVALUATION
We evaluate our system using the data collected in the
user study that is discussed in Section 4.1. We present re-
sults for different feature representations, user classification
performance, and receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curves for three different classification models and a high-
confidence ensemble model.
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Figure 2: Device usage statistics during the user study.
Total bytes, packet count, and average packet length are plotted per device from left to
right.
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Figure 3: Domain usage statistics during the user study.
Total bytes, packet count, and average packet length are plotted per domain from left
to right.
For the user classification task, we label the data using
the session start and end times of each user participating in
our user study. As it is usually not possible to train accurate
machine learning models with limited amount of data, we
decided to exclude users with less than 6 sessions in total.
We perform our analysis on six users: 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 10
who generate more than 6 sessions. We further excluded 7
sessions in total during which the network monitoring tool
was not active.
5.1 Comparison of Feature
Representations
We experiment with three different feature representations
as discussed in Section 3.4:Device-only (420 features);Domain-
only (2910 features); and Both device and domain (3330 fea-
tures). We considered time windows of different length
∆ ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30} minutes. Each time window is cre-
ated by sliding windows over the user sessions at one-minute
intervals. If a session is shorter than ∆, we generate only
one window covering the entire session.
To evaluate our ML models, we perform 7-fold cross-
validation across sessions. Thus, we keep one session for
each user for testing and select all other sessions in training.
We consider first a Random Forest (RF) classifier to evaluate
feature representations and time window length. RF is an
ensemble learning method that constructs many decision
trees using a subset of features chosen at random at each
split. RF are robust models that work well in multi-class
classification settings with many features, as ours. We will
experiment and compare other models next section.
We plot the recall, precision, and F1 score of the three
feature representation methods for varying time windows
in Figure 6. The results show that the model performance
generally increases as the time window increases until 25
minutes, at which point the best results are obtained. We
thus select a time window of 25 minutes for the rest of our
experiments. We note the inherent tradeoffs between classi-
fication accuracy and the length of observation period for
computing authentication scores. With smaller windows
length, we can generate authentication scores after limited
observation, at the cost of decreased classification perfor-
mance. Comparing different feature representations, we ob-
serve that Device-only performs well, and it is very similar to
Both device and domain. The worst performance is provided
by the Domain-only representation.
We also generate user confusion matrix for the RF models
in Table 5. Interestingly, we obtain very good classification
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Figure 4: Total amount of data transmitted by five devices for User 6 in three sessions.
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Figure 5: Total amount of data transmitted by five devices for User 10 in three sessions.
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Figure 6: Accuracy metrics for different time windows for 6 users using different
feature representations. From left to right: device based features, domain based
features, device and domain based features.
for some of the users (for instance, User 4), but worse results
for other users (e.g., User 6). User 6 is mis-classified as User
3, meaning that their behavior is fairly similar. Thus, the clas-
sification performance varies a lot across users. We believe
there are multiple factors contributing to this phenomenon,
among them the variability of user behavior and the amount
of data used for training these models.
5.2 Model Comparison
We compare three different models: Logistic Regression with
L1 regularization (LR), Random Forest (RF), and Gradient
Boosting (GB) for time windows of length 25 minutes. We
varied the hyper-parameters of these classifiers, and we se-
lect 2000 estimators for RF, and 2000 estimators for GB, with
learning rate set at 0.01 and maximum depth at 3. For this
experiment, we use the Device-only features. In Table 6 we
show user-level performance metrics for the three classifiers
when all six users are considered. As observed, GB outper-
forms both RF and LR with its average precision and recall
at 0.81 and 0.8, respectively. However, the performance of
RF and GB is fairly close, but LR has lower classification
performance (being a linear model with lower complexity).
We also generate ROC curves when training six classifiers,
each one for classifying one of the user classes versus the
rest in Figure 7. Figure 8 shows the micro-averaged results
for each of three models with six users.
Additionally, we consider a setting with only five users
(removing User 6) and show classification results in Table 9
in the Appendix. Surprisingly, by removing one of the users,
we obtain classification precision of 0.92 and recall of 0.92
with GB, an increase of more than 10% compared to the
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1 3 4 6 8 10 Count Recall Precision F1
1 5 0 1 1 0 0 7 0.71 0.71 0.71
3 0 47 0 1 0 0 48 0.97 0.81 0.88
4 0 1 20 1 0 0 22 0.90 0.95 0.93
6 0 9 0 4 0 1 14 0.28 0.57 0.38
8 1 0 0 0 4 2 7 0.57 0.8 0.66
10 1 1 0 0 1 4 7 0.57 0.57 0.57
Table 5: RF user confusionmatrix and accuracymetrics for 25minute intervals: avg. recall=0.8, avg. precision=0.78
Logistic Regression Random Forest Gradient Boosting
Recall Precision F1 Recall Precision F1 Recall Precision F1
User 1 0.42 0.6 0.5 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.85 0.75 0.79
User 3 0.52 0.69 0.59 0.97 0.81 0.88 0.93 0.86 0.9
User 4 0.81 0.62 0.70 0.90 0.95 0.93 0.90 1.0 0.95
User 6 0.71 0.45 0.55 0.28 0.57 0.38 0.5 0.53 0.51
User 8 0.42 0.5 0.46 0.57 0.8 0.66 0.42 0.75 0.54
User 10 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.5 0.53
Average 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.80 0.78 0.78 0.80 0.81 0.80
Table 6: Comparison of three ML classifiers per user and micro-average results for 6 users.
setting of six users. Figure 9 in the Appendix shows the user-
level ROC curves for five users and Figure 10 in the Appendix
shows the micro-averaged results for each of three models
with five users.
5.3 High-Confidence Ensemble Model
So far, we showed that models based on device-only features
perform relatively well at classifying users at time windows
of length 25 minutes. As we discussed initially, different ap-
plications might have different requirements in terms of the
confidence offered by the authentication score. For instance,
a financial application might require a high confidence in
the user classification module before allowing a financial
transaction. When the authentication score is used as a
factor in a multi-factor authentication system, it could be
acceptable to not compute an authentication score when
the confidence is very low.
To account for these settings, we propose the idea of de-
signing an ensemble of two models that are built indepen-
dently and can be used in combination to increase the con-
fidence in the authentication score. Our main insight is that
we can build models leveraging the device-only and domain-
only features independently, and compute an authentication
score only when the twomodels agree on the user prediction.
As a result, the overall confidence in the classification will
increase. The cost is that, in situations when the two models
disagree, no authentication score will be computed. In this
case, the upper-level applications might wait for additional
time, or leverage other authentication factors.
We test the ensemble of two Gradient Boosting models,
one built on the device-only features, and the second on the
domain-only features. We show the results of our ensemble
user classification model for six users in Table 7 and for five
users in Table 8. The F1 score of the six-user model improves
from 0.8 with a single GB model to 0.86 with the ensemble.
In the ensemble, the models do not agree on 32 out of 105
sessions. For five users, the ensemble F1 score reaches 0.97
(compared to 0.92 for a single GB model). In this case, the
ensemble does not compute a score on only 16 out of 91
sessions. Therefore, the ensemble can reliably increase the
confidence of the model, at the cost of not always providing
an authentication scores.
6 RELATEDWORK
Behavior-based authentication systems are identifying users
based on their behavior. Implicit authentication [25] shows
the applicability of behavior modeling for authentication
by utilizing the call/message information, browser activity,
and GPS history. Itus provides an extensible implicit authen-
tication framework for Android [17]. A survey of multiple
implicit authentication methods is given in [16]. Progres-
sive Authentication [23] models user behavior on mobile
devices by combining biometric features and sensor data. An-
other emerging continuous authenticationmethod leverages
the sensor information from wearable devices (e.g. smart
watches, activity trackers, glasses, bracelets) to learn user
behavior [12, 18, 22].
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Figure 7: User-level ROC curves for 25 minute time windows for three models with 6 users.
1 3 4 6 8 10 Disagreed Agreed Recall Precision F1
1 2 0 0 1 0 0 4 3 0.66 0.66 0.66
3 0 35 0 3 0 0 10 38 0.92 0.92 0.92
4 0 0 13 0 0 0 9 13 1.0 1.0 1.0
6 0 3 0 6 0 0 5 9 0.66 0.54 0.6
8 1 0 0 0 3 0 3 4 0.75 0.75 0.75
10 0 0 0 1 1 4 1 6 0.66 1.0 0.8
Total 32 73 0.86 0.87 0.86
Table 7: Confusion matrix for a Gradient Boosting ensemble with one model using the device features, and the
other the domain features for 25 minute window for 6 users. If the classifiers disagree, no authentication score is
computed.
1 3 4 8 10 Disagreed Agreed Recall Precision F1
1 3 0 0 0 0 4 3 1.0 1.0 1.0
3 0 48 0 0 0 0 48 1.0 0.97 0.98
4 0 0 15 0 0 7 15 1.0 1.0 1.0
8 0 0 0 3 0 4 3 1.0 0.75 0.85
10 0 1 0 1 4 1 6 0.66 1.0 0.8
Total 16 75 0.97 0.97 0.97
Table 8: Confusion matrix for the same ensemble model as in Table 7, but with 5 users.
Behavioral authentication in other contexts has also been
studied. Freeman et al. [11] designed an ML approach for
clustering logins based on their IP, geolocation, browser,
and time, for authenticating users to online services. Device
fingerprinting has been used to augment user authentication
on the web [4].
Authorization and access policy frameworks in the IoT
systems have also been an active research area. He et al. [14]
conducted a survey of IoT device authorization preferences
and observed that most devices have limited authorization
flexibility. ContexIoT [15] is a permission system for IoT apps
that provides users contextual information to enable them
to make better access control decisions. SmartAuth [28]
generates a user interface for authorization decisions in
IoT apps. Soteria [8] performs static analysis to identify if
IoT apps respect security policies. IoTGUARD dynamically
enforces security policies in IoT devices based on monitoring
event handlers by IoT apps [9].
There have been prior work investigating user authenti-
cation in the smart home environments. Emami-Naeini et
al. [21] perform a user study on IoT privacy and demonstrate
that users are not comfortable with biometric data collection
in IoT settings. Biometric based authentication is optional in
Alexa [2], but this is prone to recording and replay attacks.
Shi et al. [24] proposed an authentication system leveraging
physical properties of WiFi signal generated by IoT devices.
Apthorpe et al. [5] show that user actions can be inferred
from encrypted network traffic generated by IoT devices. In
this work, we utilize the network communication statistics
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Figure 8: Model ROC curves for 25-minute windows, 6
users.
of IoT devices through user interactions to build a user au-
thentication framework using machine learning. Our system
computes an authentication score for each user which can
be used by services to enforce flexible policies depending on
the sensitivity of the service.
7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Wepropose a novel user authenticationmethod by analyzing
HTTPS network traffic generated by home-based IoT devices.
We conduct a user study and experiment with several ML
algorithms using features extracted from network traffic
with the goal of classifying users from a known set of users.
We showed that random forest and gradient boostingmodels
perform well in this setting and obtain high accuracy at user
classification. Moreover, an ensemble of two models can
increase the confidence of classification, at the expense of
abstaining to produce a score when the models produce
different predictions.
We also tested several deep neural network (DNN) ar-
chitectures, including feed-forward neural networks and
LSTMs. We did not include the details in the paper, as the
accuracy of these models was not comparable with that of
gradient boosting, random forest, and our two-model en-
semble. The best F1 score for a feed-forward architecture
was 0.54 and for LSTM 0.51, whereas our gradient boosting
achieves an F1 score of 0.86. We suspect the reason is be-
cause we have a relatively limited labeled dataset available
for model training. While in principle it is possible to con-
duct the user study over longer periods of time, we found it
challenging to recruit and retain users over time.
In a practical deployment, we envision that the ML model
for user classification is continuously re-trained with new
behavioral data over time. This is particularly important as
new IoT devices are added to the smart home and users
slowly shift their interests over time. Again, a longer-term
user study would provide sufficient data to experiment with
model re-training and analyze user behavior over time as
IoT devices evolve. Another research direction would be in-
vestigating the performance of the models in the presence
of multiple active users in the smart home.
The behavioral authentication scores computed by our
authentication modules could be applied in various settings.
More importantly, they open up the possibility of creating
flexible policies for authorization and access control, and
replace today’s rigid, fixed policies. We believe that our work
opens up new research avenues in this direction, and this is
a topic of interest in our future work.
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A APPENDIX
We show here additional results for classifying five users.
Figure 9 shows the user-level ROC curves and Figure 10
shows the micro-averaged results for each of three models.
Table 9 shows the results per-user for the three models when
classifying among five users.
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Figure 9: User-level ROC curves for 25 minute time windows for three models with 5 users.
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Figure 10: Averaged ROC curves for 25 minute time windows for 5 users.
Logistic Regression Random Forest Gradient Boosting
Recall Precision F1 Recall Precision F1 Recall Precision F1
User 1 0.57 0.66 0.61 0.85 0.75 0.8 0.85 1.0 0.92
User 3 0.79 0.88 0.83 0.97 0.95 0.96 1.0 0.92 0.96
User 4 0.90 0.62 0.74 0.90 0.95 0.93 0.95 1.0 0.97
User 8 0.42 0.75 0.54 0.57 0.8 0.66 0.71 0.83 0.76
User 10 0.71 0.83 0.76 0.71 0.62 0.66 0.57 0.66 0.61
Average 0.76 0.79 0.78 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.92
Table 9: Comparison of three ML classifiers per user and micro-average results for 5 users.
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